The
Government’s acquisition of historical
cell-site location information (CSLI) from two criminal defendants’ cell phone
provider without a warrant did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because it did
not constitute a Fourth Amendment search, ruled the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 4th Circuit in a split decision (12-3) published May 31, 2016. CSLI are the records of a phone company that
identify which cell tower – usually the one closest to the cell phone –
transmitted a signal when the defendants used their cell phones to make and
receive calls and texts. To obtain the CSLI from Sprint/Nextel, the Defendants’
cell phone provider, the Government had to apply to a federal court for an
order directing the company to disclose the records pursuant to the Stored
Communications Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), (d).
Why is this case significant?
The government used the historical CSLI obtained from
Sprint/Nextel at the defendants’ trial to place them in the vicinity of the
armed robberies when the robberies had occurred. There were 221 days’ worth of
information. The defendants were convicted.
When is there fourth amendment search?
The Fourth Amendment ensures that “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend.
IV. Broadly, “a Fourth Amendment search
occurs when the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable.” The court said that an individual enjoys no
Fourth Amendment protection “in information he voluntarily turns over to [a]
third part[y].” This rule -- the third-party doctrine—applies even when “the
information is revealed” to a third party, as it was here, “on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in
the third party will not be betrayed.”
According to the Court, the
government did not surreptitiously view, listen to, record, or in any other way
engage in direct surveillance of Defendants to obtain this information. Rather,
CSLI is created and maintained in the normal course of the telephone company’s
business. The Court said that the question was whether the government invades
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy when it obtains, from a third
party, the third party’s records, which permit the government to deduce
location information. Under the third-party doctrine, an individual can claim
“no legitimate expectation of privacy” in information that he has voluntarily
turned over to a third party, because by “revealing his affairs to another,” an
individual “takes the risk . . . that the information will be conveyed by that
person to the Government.” “The Fourth
Amendment does not protect information voluntarily disclosed to a third party
because even a subjective expectation of privacy in such information is “not
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” The government
therefore does not engage in a Fourth Amendment “search” when it acquires such
information from a third party.
The Court held that
Defendants did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the CSLI records
because Defendants “exposed” the information to the phone company’s “equipment
in the ordinary course of business.” Each time Defendants made or received a
call, or sent or received a text message, Sprint/Nextel generated a record of
the cell towers used. The CSLI that Sprint/Nextel recorded was necessary to
route Defendants’ cell phone calls and texts. Having “exposed” the CSLI to
Sprint/Nextel, Defendants “assumed the risk” that the phone company would
disclose their information to the government. Therefore, the Government’s
acquisition of historical CSLI pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 2703(d) orders, rather
than warrants, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
Judge James Wynn, in his
dissent which was joined by two judges, said that a cell phone customer neither
possesses knowledge of his CSLI nor acts to disclose it. Therefore, he “has not
‘voluntarily’ shared his location information with a cellular provider in any
meaningful way” and is not subject to the third-party doctrine. U.S. v. Graham,
No. 12-4659, 12-4825 (4th Cir. 05/31/16)
An array of freedom-loving
organizations supported the criminal defendants’ position by filing amici
curiae briefs, including, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
and the American Civil Liberties Union.
(Atty. Tipon has a Master of Laws degree from Yale Law
School where he specialized in Constitutional Law. He has also a Bachelor of
Laws degree from the University of the Philippines. He placed third in the
Philippine Bar Examination in 1956. His current practice focuses on immigration
law and criminal defense. He writes law books for the world’s largest law book
publishing company and writes legal articles for newspapers. He has also a
radio show in Honolulu, Hawaii with his son Noel, senior partner of the Bilecki
& Tipon law firm, where they discuss legal and political issues. Office:
American Savings Bank Tower, 1001 Bishop Street, Suite 2305, Honolulu, Hawaii,
U.S.A. 96813. Tel. (808) 225-2645. E-Mail: filamlaw@yahoo.com. Website: www.MilitaryandCriminalLaw.com.
He was born in Laoag City, Philippines. He served as a U.S. Immigration
Officer. He is co-author with retired Manila RTC Judge Artemio S. Tipon of the
best-seller “Winning by Knowing Your Election Laws” and co-author of
“Immigration Law Service, 1st ed.,” an 8-volume practice guide for immigration
officers and lawyers. This article is a general overview of the subject matter
discussed and is not intended as legal advice. No warranty is made by the
writer or publisher as to its completeness or correctness at the time of
publication. No attorney-client relationship is established between the writer
and readers relying upon and/or acting pursuant to the contents of this
article.)
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